ticipation per se (i.e., increased participation in decision making might ordinarily lead to people actually obtaining more favorable outcomes). Although those given an opportunity to make their preferences known can hope to influence the outcome, it is clear that they may at times be unsuccessful. It is important, therefore, to distinguish between (a) the response to an opportunity to exercise a "voice" in decision making (cf. Folger, 1977; Hirschman, 1970) 1 and (b) the response to the outcome of having exercised voice. A key issue is whether voice is in itself sufficient to induce greater acceptance of decisions that result in inferior outcomes. Thibaut and Walker (1975) provide an encouraging answer to this question in suggesting that the opportunity to present evidence supporting one's own case (voice) has a remarkable effect on a defendant's satisfaction with the verdict. Their research has demonstrated (1975; see also LaTour, 1978; Walker, LaTour, Lind, & Thibaut, 1974) that the more such voice is available, the more an otherwise intolerable outcome (e.g., a guilty verdict imposed on those who think themselves innocent) becomes relatively acceptable.
We will refer to Thibaut and Walker's pattern of results as the fair process effect, This effect refers to cases in which greater satisfaction results from giving people a voice in decisions. Thibaut and Walker's results suggest that satisfaction with the procedure may also generalize to other aspects of the situation (e.g., the distribution of outcomes). Our investigation concerns the generality of the fair process effect, and we begin by examining an experiment that produced the opposite results -a pattern that we will term the frustration effect.
In a study by Thibaut, Friedland, and Walker (1974) , each of four subjects was assigned the role of a "corporation" in an industrial simulation. A fifth participant, actually a confederate, was assigned the role of a "government" empowered to collect taxes according to one of two fiscal policies, one being fair and the other being inequitable (the following account pertains only to inequitable conditions). In the "participation" condition, the fiscal policy was allegedly determined by a vote of all participants (a voice procedure). Bogus feedback about this vote showed that two corporations had voted for the equitable policy and two for the inequitable policy and that the government had cast the tie-breaking vote that established the inequitable policy. In the "no-participation" condition, the government decided on the inequitable policy without consulting the corporations.
The results showed that the proportion of taxes paid to taxes owed was approximately twice as high among no-participation subjects as among participation subjects (i.e., those who had voice were more likely to express discontent with the inequitable policy by cheating on their taxes). Thibaut et al. explained these results, which are clearly opposite from a fair procedure effect, by suggesting that discontent is intensified whenever a participative process raises hopes for a desired outcome and those hopes are dashed.
Thus the proposed mechanism whereby voice can cause heightened displeasure is increased frustration due to raised expectations (hence the term frustration effect). But if voice enhances frustration when outcomes are inferior, why was the opposite, fair process, effect evident in the LaTour (1978) and Walker et al. (1974) studies, which involved unfavorable outcomes? One possible answer (Thibaut, Note 1) is that although the decision maker in these latter studies was a neutral or "disinterested" third party, the government in the study was clearly voting for its own self-interest. However, Folger (1977) found a fair process effect under some conditions in which the allocator did benefit directly from this inequity, as was the case in the Thibaut et al. study. Since this result demonstrates a fair process effect even when the allocator's selfinterest could have biased the decision, it appears that some other aspect of the Thibaut et al. study was responsible for the frustration effect.
We suggest that the frustration effect in the study of Thibaut et al. was due to the feedback subjects did or did not receive about the other subjects' opinions. Since no vote was allowed in the no-participation condition, subjects in this condition did not know the fiscal policy the other corporations favored. In contrast, each subject in the participation condition learned that in addition to himself, one other corporation had opposed the inequitable policy; thus these subjects had social support for their opinions.
The importance of such social support is highlighted by Asch's (1952) conformity studies. When the majority's unanimity was broken by a single confederate, the ordinarily substantial rate of conformity was markedly reduced. Perhaps a similar phenomenon occurred when participation subjects learned that one other corporation agreed with their own opinion: This support from a solitary peer may have reduced these subjects' tendencies to conform to the government's opinion, thereby leaving them more dissatisfied with the inequitable result. Unfortunately, since voice and feedback about others' opinions were confounded in the Thibaut et al. experiment, it is impossible to determine which factor was responsible for the obtained effect. The present line of investigation involves two experiments designed to shed light on this issue by manipulating procedure and feedback independently of one another.
It is predicted that voice will interact with the feedback the subject receives concerning the other subject's opinion. The exercise of voice should lead to more positive responses when subjects do not receive any feedback from others supporting their own opinion that the decision was unfair, conditions similar to those that yielded a fair process effect in the LaTour (1978) and Walker et al. (1974) studies. However, when subjects receive information from others that confirms their beliefs and indicates that the final decision was inequitable (as in the Thibaut et al. study), then voice may not lead to a fair process effect. Additionally, Experiment 1 will include a manipulation of whether the decision maker is biased or unbiased. As noted above, Thibaut has suggested that voice may not lead to a fair process effect if the decision maker has some external inducement that might have biased his or her decision.
Experiment 1

Method
Subjects. The subjects were 82 female undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course. They received extra credit for participating in the experiment. Although the gender was restricted primarily for convenience, it should be noted that previous research has suggested that females are more likely than males to prefer an equal division of outcomes (e.g., Leventhal & Lane, 1970) .
Procedure. The participants, scheduled in groups of three, were seated in separate rooms and listened to taped instructions. They were told that the study was simulating business decision making and that a random drawing would assign subjects to the roles of "decision maker" and "workers" (each person was actually assigned the worker role). Workers were to make small words from the letters of a larger word and to help evaluate the decision maker's effectiveness. There would be two sessions of four word-making trials, and on each trial the decision maker would select from a list of words a subset that would be given to the two workers (making the selection so that the number of possible smaller words would be maximized). The subjects were also told that they would receive lottery tickets for a $50 prize as additional compensation. Nine tickets were to be distributed during each of the two work sessions, with three of those tickets going to the decision maker. The decision maker would decide how to divide the remaining six tickets between the two workers.
Subjects in the unbiased decision-maker condition were told that whoever drew the role of decision maker would keep that role for both work sessions, which meant that she would receive the same number of tickets regardless of how she chose to allocate the workers' tickets. In the biased condition, the person initially chosen as decision maker would have that role for one session only. During the second session, one of the workers would become the new decision maker and would be in a position to determine how many tickets the original, first-session decision maker would receive during the second session. Thus, the decision maker's ticket allocation during the first session might be biased because she would have an extrinsic reason to favor one worker (the one who would be the next decision maker) over the other.
In all conditions, the drawing was rigged so that the subject believed that she would be a worker (Worker B) during both sessions. In the biased condition, she also believed that the other worker for the first session (Worker A) would be the decision maker during the second session. Note that subjects thought the initial decision maker knew which first session worker would be the decision maker during the second session (Worker A).
After the first session, every subject was asked to complete ("for our records") an "opinion card" on which she wrote her ideas of the fair way to divide the lottery tickets for that session. In the voice conditions, the experimenter then added the following statement:
Even though the decision maker will be making the final decision about how the lottery tickets will be divided, one of you workers will have an opportunity to let her know what you think is fair before she makes her decision. We will have a drawing and the worker who wins the drawing will get to have her opinion card shown to the decision maker.
Subjects in the mute (no voice) condition were not given these additional instructions.
Before the subject filled out her opinion card, the experimenter counted the total number of smaller words that she had made (supposedly to be reported to the decision maker) and told the subject how many words the other worker had allegedly formed (one more than the subject's total). The experimenter then left, taking the opinion card with her in the voice conditions. The experimenter administered the feedback manipulation upon her return. Subjects in the inequity-confirmed conditions were told that the co-worker had suggested an even split of the six tickets, whereas the decision maker had chosen to give that co-worker four of the tickets and to give the subject only two. The information about the coworker's opinion thereby reinforced the subject's feelings that a 3-3 split was fair and confirmed that the 4-2 decision was inequitable. Subjects in the nofeedback conditions were only told about the decision maker's allocation (a 4-2 split favoring the other worker). It should be noted that in the biased condition, the 4-2 split favored the worker who was to become the decision maker during the next session. Thus that decision could apparently have been due to the decision maker's desire to be treated favorably during the second session.
Subjects were then given a questionnaire to evaluate the effectiveness of the decision maker. Included were items concerning the subject's feelings about the fairness of the allocation and about the fairness of the decision-making process, each answered on a scale anchored by "very unfair" (1) and "very fair" (11). Another item assessed subjects' general satisfaction with the work situation on a scale ranging from "very dissatisfied" (1) to "very satisfied" (11). Finally, two questions asked the subjects to rate their decision maker on scales of "incompetent" (1) to "competent" (11) and "inefficient" (1) to "efficient" (11). Answers to these two items were summed to obtain an average rating of the decision maker.
After completing the questionnaire, the subjects were told that there was not enough time left to finish the experiment. The experimenter then attempted to assess any suspicions that the subjects had and debriefed them. The subjects were also told that they would each receive three tickets for the lottery. A lottery drawing actually took place at the end of the semester, and the winner was given her $50.
Results and Discussion
The results were analyzed by a 2 X 2 X 2 multivariate analysis of variance. This MANOVA revealed that the Feedback (No Feedback vs. Inequity-Confirmed) X Procedure (Voice vs. Mute) interaction was significant, F(4, 71) = 2.77, p< .05. Also, the procedure main effect was marginally significant, F(4, 71) = 2.07, p < .09. Given these results, univariate analyses of variance (ANOVAS) were examined to determine the nature of these effects.
The univariate ANOVAS showed significant procedure main effects on the fairness of the process, the ratings of the decision maker, and the fairness of the allocation, F(l, 74) = 7.4S, p < .01; F(l, 74) = 4.30, p < .OS; and F(l, 74) = 5.72, p < .05, respectively. As Table 1 shows, subjects in voice conditions generally expressed more positive feelings than those in the mute conditions. Note, however, that the mute-voice differences are always larger within the no-feedback condition; these differences are generally quite minimal in the inequity-confirmed condition and are even reversed slightly on the satisfaction measure.
In fact, the procedure main effect is qualified by the significant Feedback X Procedure interaction, indicating that the main effect was due almost entirely to the large differences within the no-feedback condition. This interaction was significant on the univariate analyses of the fairness of the decision-making process and the subject's satisfaction with the work situation, F(l, 74) = 5.34, p < .05, and F(l, 74) = 4.89, p < .05, respectively. As Table 1 demonstrates, voice did not lead to substantially more positive reactions than did mute in the inequity-confirmed conditions (p > .50 for each of the four dependent measures), but it did lead to substantially more positive feelings for those subjects who were given no feedback and hence were not as convinced that they had been treated inequitably (p < .05 for fairness of the process and satisfaction with the work situation). This experiment thus substantiates that voice sometimes tends to mitigate the distress associated with inequitable treatment; however, the significant Feedback X Procedure interaction indicates that voice alleviates distress only when the subjects do not receive a second opinion from their co-workers suggesting that the co-workers also feel that the decision was inequitable. When such an opinion is received (which reinforces the belief that the decision was unfair), voice does not make the subjects feel that the inequitable decision was any more satisfying.
There was little evidence of any strong tendency for knowledge of a supportive opinion to make voice any less satisfying than the mute procedure, as it did in the Thibaut et al. study. However, it is possible that increased displeasure due to voice may be unique to situations in which decision makers stand to benefit directly from the allocation, as they did in the Thibaut et al. study. In our study, the decision maker could benefit indirectly in the biased conditions (if giving more lottery tickets to the worker who would be the next allocator would increase the chances of being overrewarded by her in return), but the indirect nature of this advantage may have reduced its salience, as is reflected in the absence of any significant differences between the biased and unbiased conditions. Since Experiment 2 placed the decision maker in a position to benefit directly from reducing the payments to other people, further discussion of frustration effects will be postponed until after the presentation of that experiment.
Experiment 2
Method
Subjects. In response to telephone solicitations, 61 female high school students participated. Each understood that she would receive at least the minimum wage for participating for 1 hour in a study about "working conditions."
Procedure. Experiment 2 was conducted similarly to Experiment 1, with several exceptions. First, there was no biased-unbiased manipulation (Experiment 2 used biased conditions only). During each work session, the decision maker supposedly had $3.00 to divide between herself and the two workers. Thus, by giving the workers less (her decision was allegedly to give the workers $.75 each), she was able to keep more for herself ($1.50). In keeping with this procedure, it was further announced that the decision maker would remain in that role for the entire experiment (three sessions).
Another difference was that the feedback manipulation was stronger. In the inequity-confirmed conditions, subjects were told that their co-worker had indicated on her opinion card that an even split of the $3.00 was fair. Since the decision maker supposedly gave the workers only $.75 while keeping $1.50 for herself, this feedback confirmed the subjects' feelings that the decision was inequitable. In the inequity-disconfirmed conditions, the subjects again received information about their co-worker's opinion, but this time the co-worker supposedly had indicated that $.75 for the workers and $1.50 for the decision maker was fair. Another difference between the first and second studies was that the decision maker in the latter was not told how many words the subjects had formed. Thus her decision was made (allegedly) without taking productivity into account.
The final difference involved dependent measures. In addition to the measures used in Experiment 1, Experiment 2 also asked subjects to indicate how certain they were that the division of money that they had written down on their opinion card (before learning about the decision maker's allocation or their co-worker's opinion) was the fair way to split the money, on an 11-point scale from "not at all certain" to "very certain" (57 out of 61 had originally indicated that an equal split was fair). Another additional measure was assessed just after the second session. Subjects were told that there was not enough time to complete the third session, so the experiment would have to be terminated. This problem had supposedly come up before, however, and in those cases it had been decided that since the decision maker was not selecting any words for the last session, there was no reason why the decision maker should distribute the money for that session. Thus subjects were told that one of the workers would decide how to divide the money for that session, and a drawing took place to decide which worker would make the decision, arranged so that the subject always won. The subject was then asked to make the allocation, and the amount given to the decision maker was used as a behavioral measure of her satisfaction with the decision maker.
Results and Discussion
The results were initially analyzed by a 2x2 MANOVA. This MANOVA indicated that both main effects and the interaction were significant, ^(6, 51) = 2.46, p < .OS, for the procedure main effect; F(6, 51) = 4.35, p < .005, for the feedback main effect; and F(6, 51) = 2.61, p < .05, for the Feedback X Procedure interaction. Univariate ANOVAS were then examined to determine the nature of these effects.
The Feedback X Procedure interaction was either significant or marginally significant on the fairness of the decision-making process (p < .05), the amount of money given to the decision maker (p < .06), and the subjects' certainty about their original opinion of the fairness of an equal division (p < .05). The cell means (see Table 2 ) and appropriate contrasts show that voice led to more positive feelings (in the form of more bonus money given to the allocator, greater perceptions of fairness, and less certainty that an equal split was fair) when the feedback from the other worker indicated that the decision was not inequitable (inequity-disconfirmed conditions, ps < .05), but that mute-voice differences tended to be slightly (although nonsignificantly) in the opposite direction in the inequity-confirmed conditions.
The feedback main effect was also significant on each of these measures, as well as on the subjects' ratings of the decision maker and the fairness of the decision (ps < .05). The cell means show that subjects were generally more content with their low outcome when co-worker's feedback indicated that there was no inequity than when it confirmed that the inequity existed. It is important to note that this difference was substantial only in the voice conditions, however, and was usually very small (or even slightly in the opposite direction) in the mute conditions. Finally, the procedure main effect was significant only on the certainty measure (p < .005). Voice subjects were significantly less certain that an even split was fair, but consistent with the interaction, this was significant only in the inequity-disconfirmed condition (p < .05).
The obtained main effect for feedback is not surprising, given the evidence that a person's discontent with a leader will be affected by whether a fellow member of the group endorses or expresses displeasure with the leader (Michener & Tausig, 1971; Michener & Lyons, 1972) . What is striking, however, is the nature of the Feedback X Procedure interaction: Contrary to the trend within the inequity-confirmation conditions, inequitydisconfirmation subjects displayed more discontent under mute than under voice procedures. The latter result is noteworthy since it means voice has a mitigating effect on discontent over and above that due to a disconfirmation of one's own opinion. Voice-disconfirmation subjects were not only less distressed than mute-disconfirmation subjects about their inequitable treatment but also seemed even somewhat pleased in an absolute sense. Voice-disconfirmation subjects' ratings of the fairness of the process averaged nearly 9 on an 11-point scale, their average allocation to the decision maker was more than $1 of the available $3, and the certainty measure showed that voice-disconfirmation subjects even came to entertain some doubts about their initial judgment of what was fair.
General Discussion
The results from both of these experiments display a similar pattern, in which the voice procedure is associated with more positive affect than the mute procedure is under some circumstances (no-feedback conditions, Experiment 1; inequity-disconfirmation conditions, Experiment 2), whereas this tendency is virtually neutralized (Experiment 1) or even slightly reversed (Experiment 2) under other circumstances (inequity-confirmation conditions). This pattern is contrary to the commonsense prediction that a voice procedure should always produce less discontent than a mute procedure would because it is fairer, but the results are consistent with our contention that the positive impact of voice tends to be neutralized when the viewpoint expressed by a fellow recipient confirms one's own opinion that the allocation was unfair. An understanding of why such a confirmation mitigates the desirability of voice can be gained by first considering why voice should be desirable.
Voice may be desirable for two reasons. First, voice may be preferable to mute procedures because the latter are based on incomplete information. A mute procedure may not take into account the claims of disputants and hence may entail an inferior, or at least suspect, decision. Second, being given a voice in the decision is considered to be a fairer procedure than being given no voice. Someone who is given voice at least has a chance to defend his/her position and present his/her side of the issue. The general preference for voice over mute procedures (Houlden, LaTour, Walker, & Thibaut, 1978; LaTour, 1978; Thibaut, Walker, LaTour, & Houlden, 1974; Walker et al., 1974) is so strong that disputants with the preponderance of evidence in their favor prefer a voice procedure over a mute procedure even though it may allow their opponents to present claims more strongly and could hence promote their opponents' position. This preference is shared by the decision makers themselves when they are given absolute authority and thus might "efficiently" resolve the dispute without having to consult the disputants.
Given the desirability of voice, it might be expected to affect positively the acceptability of a decision even when that decision provides undesirable outcomes. Our results show this to be the case under two conditions: when people do not know whether anyone else would agree that they have been cheated (Experiment 1) and when they discover that a co-worker's opinion disconfirms their belief that they have been cheated (Experiment 2). Thus, when subjects were not certain that they had been treated inequitably, the voice procedure was rated fairer than the mute procedure and there was a more favorable reaction to the decision maker and to the entire situation.
On the other hand, when people learn that someone else agrees that they have been denied their just deserts (inequity-confirmation conditions), the positive impact of voice seems to be negated; indeed, our results show that when supportive social "evidence" is available, the fairness of the allocation procedure becomes essentially irrelevant. Presumably the raison d'etre of having a fair procedure is to prevent inequities by improving the quality of information on which the allo-cation decision is based, but this possible advantage is obviously not present when it is clear that an injustice has been done. Thus, although the voice procedure could have potentially been fairer than the mute procedure, when the voiced opinions seem to have been completely ignored such a procedure is no longer perceived to be any better than a mute procedure. Support for this view comes from our "fair process" measure, which showed that subjects in the inequity-confirmation conditions did not rate the voice procedure as any fairer than the mute procedure.
Although the overall pattern of results does show that some circumstances are more likely than others to promote the fair process effect, the evidence regarding when voice procedures will lead to greater discontent (the frustration effect) is less conclusive. Frustration effect tendencies appeared only in Experiment 2, where they were nonsignificant. The main reason that the present frustration effect tendencies were less pronounced than those in the experiment may be that voice and inequity-confirmation were confounded in the Thibaut et al. study, whereas they were manipulated independently in the present experiment. The discontent expressed by participation (voice) subjects in the Thibaut et al. study may have been due to the fact that the voice subjects were given another opinion that confirmed their feelings that the decision was inequitable. Subjects in their no-participation (mute) conditions did not receive any such supporting opinion. Since opinions confirming the inequity can substantially increase discontent (as shown in Experiment 2 and in Lyons, 1972, and Tausig, 1971) , this confirming opinion may have been responsible for the obtained frustration effect in their study.
We should also point out, however, that other studies have at times found frustration effects. For example, Austin, Williams, Worchel, Wentzel, and Siegel (Note 2) found that the provision of voice in a mock trial led to greater discontent when the verdict was highly unfavorable but led to greater satisfaction when the verdict was favorable. Furthermore, the provision of voice under circumstances in which outcomes improve after voice (although cumulative outcomes remain inequitable) has been observed to create a frustration effect in at least two instances (certain conditions of an experiment by Folger, 1977 , and an earlier study by Thibaut, 19SO) . These results indicate that the frustration effect found by Thibaut et al. may not have been due solely to the confound between voice and inequity-confirmation. This possibility, coupled with our finding that the positive effects of voice can be neutralized under certain circumstances, indicates the need for further study of the conditions under which voice can affect one's satisfaction either positively or negatively. Field studies, where involvement level and applicability are high, would be especially helpful.
